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The	pork	barrel	politics	of	the	Towns	Fund:	funding
decisions	were	driven	by	party-political
considerations,	not	by	need
The	Towns	Fund	is	a	scheme	designed	to	support	towns	across	England,	particularly	those
with	high	levels	of	income	deprivation.	Chris	Hanretty	takes	a	look	at	the	selection	of	towns
invited	to	bid	for	funding	under	the	scheme.	He	finds	that	the	funding	decisions	were	driven	by
party-political	considerations,	not	by	need.
In	July	of	last	year,	Boris	Johnson	announced	a	scheme	(“the	Towns	Fund”)	to	improve	towns
across	England.	In	September,	the	Ministry	of	Housing,	Communities	and	Local	Government
published	a	list	of	101	towns	specially	selected	to	bid	for	a	tranche	of	this	funding.	Journalists
and	opposition	politicians	were	quick	to	realise	that	many	of	the	chosen	towns	were	in	Conservative	marginals.	The
speculation	led	to	a	National	Audit	Office	(NAO)	report	and	an	inquiry	by	the	Public	Accounts	Committee.	This
scrutiny	is	entirely	warranted:	my	analysis	of	the	scheme	suggests	strongly	that	it	was	party-political	considerations,
not	merit,	which	determined	which	towns	were	chosen.
The	selection	of	towns	started	with	a	long-list	of	541	towns	in	England	(excluding	London)	which	civil	servants	had
identified	as	having	higher-than-average	levels	of	income	deprivation.	Civil	servants	scored	these	towns,
sometimes	using	quantitative	measures	(skills	deprivation,	income	deprivation)	and	sometimes	qualitative
measures	(suitability	for	future	investment,	alignment	with	other	government	programmes).	Each	English	region
was	given	an	initial	allocation	of	towns,	and	towns	within	each	region	were	grouped	into	high,	medium,	or	low-
priority	bands.	Ministers	agreed	to	fund	all	of	the	towns	in	the	high-priority	group,	but	exercised	discretion	over	the
selection	of	towns	in	the	medium-	and	low-priority	groups.	The	list	of	towns	considered,	together	with	their	scores
and	associated	ranks,	was	published	in	a	NAO	report	earlier	this	year.
“Towns”	aren’t	a	common	administrative	unit,	and	it	takes	some	work	to	relate	towns	to	Westminster	constituencies.
Formally,	towns	are	built-up	areas,	or	subdivisions	of	built-up	areas,	and	the	ONS	makes	boundary	files	of	these
built-up	areas	freely	available.	By	merging	these	boundary	files	with	boundary	files	for	Westminster	constituencies,
we	can	identify	which	towns	were	located	either	in	whole	or	in	part	in	Conservative-held	seats	at	the	time	the
selection	decisions	were	made.
Figure	1:	Boundaries	for	two	towns	(black)	and	their	surrounding	Westminster	constituencies	(dotted	blue).
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Figure	1	uses	these	boundary	files	to	chart	two	towns.	On	the	left,	we	see	Glastonbury,	wholly	contained	within	the
boundaries	of	Wells.	On	the	right,	we	see	Skegness,	which	is	split	between	the	constituencies	of	Louth	and
Horncastle	and	Boston	and	Skegness	(both	Conservative-held).	I’ll	refer	to	both	of	these	towns	as	“Conservative-
held”,	even	though	this	description	catches	some	towns	with	some	Labour	or	Lib	Dem	representation.	When	I	talk
about	the	Conservative	majorities	in	these	towns,	I’ll	take	either	the	sole	Conservative	majority	(for	towns	contained
in	a	single	seat)	or	the	average	of	the	Conservative	majorities.
Baseline	data	–	seats
A	first	pass	at	the	data	shows	that	“Conservative-held”	towns	were	much	more	likely	to	receive	funding.	Figure	2
below	shows	that	the	success	rate	for	Conservative	towns	was	ten	percentage	points	higher	than	the	rate	for	all
other	towns,	and	very	close	to	twice	as	high.
Figure	2:	Success	rates	according	to	whether	or	not	the	town	was	Conservative-held.
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The	category	of	“Conservative-held	towns”	includes	towns	with	very	different	characters.	It	runs	the	range	from
Stockport	to	the	town	of	Holbeach,	which	is	in	the	wonderfully	named	constituency	of	South	Holland	and	the
Deepings,	and	which	has	the	largest	Conservative	majority	in	the	country.	It’s	because	of	this	(electoral)	diversity
that	Figure	3	below	shows	the	success	rates	for	towns	according	to	the	size	of	their	Conservative	majority.	When
the	Conservative	majority	is	very	large,	success	rates	are	more	or	less	average.	It’s	only	when	we	move	into
marginal	Conservative	towns	that	the	success	rates	spike.	Spending	isn’t	entirely	focused	on	Conservative	held
seats	–	Conservative	targets	(seats	where	the	Labour	or	Lib	Dem	majority	is	less	than	5%)	have	higher	success
rates	than	safe	Conservative	towns.
Figure	3:	Success	rates	by	size	of	Conservative	majority.
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These	patterns	do	not	provide	conclusive	evidence	that	party-political	considerations	determined	the	choice	of
towns.	It’s	possible	that	those	towns	which	were	most	deserving	(on	the	basis	of	the	criteria	assembled	by	civil
servants)	just	happened	to	also	be	Conservative	marginals.	Figure	4	shows	this	isn’t	the	case.	This	figure	breaks
down	success	rates	by	whether	a	town	was	Conservative-held	or	not,	and	by	the	priority	grouping	the	town	was
placed	in.	As	the	graph	shows,	the	success	rate	for	Conservative-held	towns	in	the	low	priority	group	was	actually
higher	than	the	success	rate	for	all	other	towns	in	the	medium	priority	group.	The	bias	in	favour	of	Conservative-
held	towns	was	sufficiently	large	to	over-turn	civil	service	recommendations	not	just	on	fine	distinctions	within	broad
categories	but	concerning	the	drift	of	the	scheme	as	a	whole.
Figure	4:	Success	rates	by	incumbency	and	priority	grouping.
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Of	course,	it’s	possible	that	ministers	used	the	same	criteria	that	civil	servants	used,	just	in	a	slightly	different	way.
Civil	servants	placed	weights	on	a	range	of	criteria	to	come	up	with	the	scores	used	in	the	ranking.	But	it’s	possible
that	ministers	(for	example)	placed	greater	weight	on	future	investment	opportunities	and	alignment	with	broader
government	policies	than	the	criteria	measuring	skills	and	income	deprivation.	In	order	to	test	this	possibility,	I	ran	a
series	of	regression	models,	trying	to	predict	town	selection	on	the	basis	of	the	town’s	rank,	and	whether	or	not	it
was	in	a	Conservative	held	seat.	Altogether,	I	ran	127	regression	models	covering	all	possible	combinations	of	the
criteria	used	in	the	scheme.	In	every	single	one	of	these	models,	the	effect	of	being	in	a	Conservative-held	seat	was
positive	and	significantly	different	from	zero.	The	patterns	shown	in	Figure	4	can’t	be	explained	by	different	ways	in
which	ministers	used	civil	service	supplied	figures.
Although	the	selection	of	towns	seems	to	have	been	driven,	in	a	strong	and	clear	way,	by	electoral	considerations,
that	doesn’t	mean	that	it	brought	the	Conservative	party	any	electoral	benefit.	When	I	model	the	2019	Conservative
vote	share	in	English	regions	outside	of	London,	controlling	for	2017	Conservative	vote	share	and	incumbency	and
the	number	of	(eligible)	towns	in	each	seat,	I	find	that	seats	with	selected	towns	had	Conservative	vote	shares	that
were	0.22	percentage	points	higher,	but	this	effect	wasn’t	significantly	different	from	zero,	and	could	well	have	been
between	-0.56	percentage	points	and	0.99	percentage	points.	The	evidence	that	towns	benefitted	from	being	in
Conservative	seats	is	therefore	much	stronger	than	the	evidence	that	the	Conservatives	benefitted	from	selecting
towns.
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On	the	basis	of	the	data	collated	by	the	ministry	and	published	by	the	NAO,	there	is	robust	evidence	that	ministers
chose	towns	so	as	to	benefit	the	Conservatives	in	marginal	Westminster	seats.	This	evidence	is	robust	in	the	sense
that	the	effects	persists	even	when	controlling	for	other	town	characteristics	that	might	justifiably	affect	selection.
Choosing	towns	to	benefit	a	particular	party	goes	against	the	seven	principles	of	public	life	(the	‘Nolan	principles’),
and	in	particular	the	obligation	to	“take	decisions	impartially,	fairly	and	on	merit,	using	the	best	evidence	and	without
discrimination	or	bias”.	These	decisions	should	therefore	be	examined	both	by	the	Public	Accounts	Committee	and
(since	the	decisions	potentially	involve	a	breach	of	the	Ministerial	Code,	which	incorporates	the	Nolan	principles)	by
the	Cabinet	Office	upon	referral	by	the	Prime	Minister.
____________________
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